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CONTRIBUTION AMONG ANTITRUST
VIOLATORS
The private treble damage antitrust suit' is a widely used and increas-
ingly important method of enforcing federal antitrust laws.2 Antitrust vio-
lators subject to such actions are jointly and severally liable for treble
damages.3 Under a rule of joint and several liability, a plaintiff may sue or
enforce a judgment against one of several jointly liable parties and recover
from it alone three times the damages attributable to the illegal acts of all
the parties. Although individual violators may limit their liability by set-
tling with the plaintiff prior to judgment, the plaintiff may still collect from
any nonsettling defendants three times the damages attributable to both
settlers and nonsettlers less only the dollar amount of any settlement pay-
ments it has received.4 Thus, whenever one violator settles with the plain-
tiff for a sum less than three times the damages attributable to its own acts,
each remaining defendant faces an increased risk that it will be forced to
bear more than its proportionate share of the damages.5
1. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), creates a private cause of action
for any person injured in his business or property by a violation of antitrust laws and pro-
vides for the recovery of treble damages as well as costs and attorney's fees.
2. Over 7,000 private antitrust cases were filed in federal district courts in the period
from 1960 to 1972. In 1972 alone, 1,299 private cases were filed, an increase of 29.5% over
the number filed in 1971. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 254
& n.l (1975) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS]. The Supreme Court has
noted that "Congress has expressed its belief that private antitrust litigation is one of the
surest weapons for effective enforcement of antitrust laws .. " Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318 (1965).
3. See Solomon v. Houston Corrugated Box Co., 526 F.2d 389, 392 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976);
Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D. Cal. 1968). In
antitrust litigation, which may involve a nation-wide class of plaintiffs and an industry-wide
conspiracy, damages assessed against a sole defendant can exceed one billion dollars under
this rule. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, [1979] 2 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) $ 62,689 (S.D. Tex.), a'dmem., 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979) (liability of non-
settling defendants estimated at $600 million to $3 billion, not including attorney's fees).
4. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 348 (1971);
Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 397-98 (9th Cir. 1957).
5. The risk of disproportionate liability increases in two ways. Since the defendants
are jointly and severally liable, the plaintiff may elect to enforce the entire judgment against
only one of them. Thus, as the pool of nonsettling defendants decreases, each faces a greater
risk that it alone will bear the entire burden of compensation. In addition, even if the non-
settling defendants pay equal shares, the amount of each one's share will increase whenever
one of them settles for less than its proportionate share. For example, if four defendants
faced a total liability of $1,000,000 ($250,000 per defendant if equally divided), and one
settled for $100,000, the equal share for each of the remaining three defendants would in-
crease from $250,000 to $300,000.
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The combination of this settlement practice and joint and several liabil-
ity has been criticized as being unfair in two ways. First, one or a few
jointly liable violators may be forced to bear the entire burden of paying
treble damages while the others escape all liability.6 Second, faced with an
increased risk of liability as some violators settle, innocent defendants may
eventually be forced to pay large settlement sums rather than risk liability
for damages caused by the settlers.7 The doctrine of contribution would
alleviate these inequities among antitrust violators by permitting defend-
ants who have paid more than their share of an injured party's losses to
recoup the amount of their overpayments from those jointly liable wrong-
doers who have paid less than their share.' In this way, contribution
would limit the liability of each violator to its own share of the damages
and reduce the pressure for settlement in antitrust actions.
Until recently, no federal circuit court had ruled on whether defendants
in treble damage antitrust actions were entitled to contribution from other
jointly liable parties, and the few federal district courts that had addressed
this issue had dismissed the claims for contribution.9 In Professional
Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc. , i however, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that, in appropriate
circumstances, defendants in antitrust actions may be entitled to contribu-
tion from other joint tortfeasors. " As a result of this decision, there has
6. See, e.g., Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d
1179, 1185-86 (8th Cir. 1979).
7. See, e.g., Antitrust Equal Enforcemen Act.: Hearings on S. 1468 Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 66-70 (1979) (prepared statement of Donald G. Kempf, Jr.) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on S. 1468].
8. For a general discussion of contribution among tortfeasors, see W. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS § 50 (4th ed. 1971). See also notes 16-31 and accompanying text infra.
9. See, e.g., In re Beef Antitrust Litigation, J.P.M.D.L. No. 248 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 1,
1978); Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1977] 2 Trade Cas. 61,698 (D. Utah
1977), af'd, [1979] 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,995 (10th Cir. 1979); Wilson P. Abra-
ham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., No. 75-2820 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 1977), affid, 604 F.2d
897 (5th Cir. 1979); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977] 1 Trade Cas. T 61,533
(N.D. Cal. 1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American Presidential Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp.
1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The district courts in Olson Farms, Abraham Construction, and In re
Beef gave little justification for their dismissal of the contribution claims. The district courts
in El Camino Glass and Sabre Shiping briefly discussed the merits of the contribution issue
but based their denials of contribution primarily on the conclusions that rights of antitrust
violators were governed by federal law which did not recognize contribution among
tortfeasors and that Congress intended to deny contribution to antitrust violators. For a
general discussion of these two cases, see Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Suits, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 682, 683-87 (1978).
10. 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
11. Id at 1186. Courts and commentators have usually characterized private antitrust
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been a renewed interest in this issue in both the legal community and in
Congress.' 2 Recently in Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp. v. Texas
Industries, Inc. '" a second federal circuit court addressed the contribution
issue and held that violators of antitrust laws are never entitled to contri-
bution. 4 A limited application of contribution has also been proposed in
Congress. Senator Birch Bayh recently introduced a bill, S. 1468," 5 which
would permit contribution among antitrust violators involved in price-
fixing agreements.
This Note discusses contribution among antitrust violators in light of the
arguments raised in Professional Beauty Supply, Abraham Construction,
and the testimony during the hearings on S. 1468. After considering vari-
ous methods of implementing contribution in antitrust litigation and their
potential effects on the goals of antitrust laws, the Note concludes that con-
tribution would be inappropriate in antitrust actions unless settling viola-
tors would avoid liability for contribution and the doctrine were limited to
less culpable violators through a case-by-case eligibility determination.
I. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS: STRIKING AN
ACCOMMODATION
Based on the early English case of Merryweather v. Nixan,' 6 at one time
suits as tort actions. See, e.g., Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604
F.2d 897, 901 n.5 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Corbett, Apportionment of Damages and Contribu-
tion Among Coconspirators in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 31 FORDHAM L. REV. Il1,
114 (1962). But see Note, supra note 9, at 692-97 (article written before Professional Beauty
Supply, suggesting that some antitrust actions are based on a theory of implied contract and
therefore contribution should be allowed as in contract law).
12. Since Professional Beauty Supply, several district courts have denied claims for con-
tribution. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, J.P.M.D.L. No. 323 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5,
1979); Hedges Enterprise v. Continental Group, Inc., [1979] 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
62,717 (E.D. Pa. 1979); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, [1979] 1 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 62,689 (S.D. Tex.), qf'd mem., 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979); In re
Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, J.P.M.D.L. No. 50 (D.D.C. May 21, 1979); Alabama v. Blue
Bird Body Co., No. 75-23-N (M.D. Ala. May 19, 1979). The contribution issue has also been
raised before a district court in the Eighth Circuit with regard to a proposed settlement
agreement. See Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., Nos. 76-C-41, 77-C-126 (E.D. Ark.
June 29, 1979).
13. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979).
14. Id at 899.
15. S. 1468, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 8931 (1979). The text and an expla-
nation of this bill appear in S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5, 20-24, reprinted in
[1979] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 942, at 1-2, 8-9 (Special Supp.).
16. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799). In Merryweather, the court denied contribution to an
intentional joint tortfeasor upon whom the entire judgment had been levied. Id While the
case has been cited as authority for denying contribution to both unintentional and inten-
tional tortfeasors, most commentators view the holding as limited to intentional tortfeasors.
See W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 50.
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the majority of American jurisdictions denied contribution to all
tortfeasors.' 7 More recently, however, a substantial majority of the states
have adopted the contribution doctrine either by statute or, in a few in-
stances, by judicial decision. 8 The impetus behind this trend has been the
perceived unfairness of the rule of joint and several liability that permits
an injured party to collect all of its damages from one of several tortfeasors
while the other wrongdoers avoid all liability for their tortious acts.' 9 The
implementation of this equitable doctrine in tort law, however, has re-
quired the accommodation of the often conflicting interests of fairness to
the litigating parties, judicial economy, and promotion of the settlement
process. Seeking to reconcile these interests, the majority of jurisdictions
allowing contribution have denied its application to intentional
tortfeasors2° and have formulated other diverse rules limiting the scope of
this doctrine. 2 Three different uniform acts addressing the effect of settle-
ment on the right to contribution illustrate the difficulty of accommodating
these interests.22
Sections 4 and 5 of the 1939 version of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act provide that a tortfeasor who settles with the in-
jured party extinguishes its liability to that party but remains liable to non-
settling joint tortfeasors for contribution. Thus, regardless of settlement,
the burden of compensating the injured party is distributed among all joint
17. See W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 50.
18. The District of Columbia and 37 states now recognize some form of contribution
among tortfeasors. See Note, supra note 9, at 698 n.87 (citing statutes in 31 jurisdictions and
cases adopting contribution in seven others). See also UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG
TORTFEASORS ACT (prefatory note); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A, comment a
(1977); W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 50.
19. See W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 50.
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A, Comment a (1977).
21. For a discussion of some of these rules, see notes 22-28 and accompanying text
infra.
22. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 4 (1977 version); UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION
AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 1 (1955 version); UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG
TORTFEASORS ACT §§ 4, 5 (1939 version) [hereinafter cited as 1955 ACT and 1939 ACT
respectively]. The formulation of a satisfactory settlement rule has been a particularly diffi-
cult problem in allowing contribution among joint tortfeasors. Although the American Law
Institute has endorsed this doctrine generally, it has characterized all methods of handling
settlement under the doctrine of contribution as unsatisfactory. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 886A Caveat, Comment m (1977). In contrast to the conflicting positions in the
uniform acts over the rights of nonsettling tortfeasors to obtain contribution from settling
tortfeasors, each uniform act has similar provisions allowing a settling tortfeasor to obtain
contribution from nonsettling tortfeasors if it pays a reasonable amount for the release of all
the joint wrongdoers from liability. See UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 4; 1955
ACT, supra, § 4; 1939 ACT, supra, § 2(3).
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tortfeasors according to the share of damages allocable to each one.2 3 The
1939 Act also allows an injured party to gain full compensation for its
losses by recovering from the nonsettling defendants the full amount of its
damages less only the amount of any settlement payments it has already
received. 24 Under these provisions, however, there is little incentive for
joint tortfeasors to enter into a settlement agreement because they can
avoid neither liability for contribution nor the possibility of further litiga-
tion by settling with the injured party.
Seeking to encourage out-of-court settlements, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted a second approach in
the 1955 version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.25
Section 4 of the 1955 Act provides that tortfeasors who settle in good faith
with the injured party extinguish their liability to nonsettling tortfeasors
for contribution. Since it permits tortfeasors to discharge all liability and
avoid further litigation by settling in good faith, the Act protects the incen-
tive for defendants to reach settlement agreements with the plaintiff. The
1955 Act further provides that, upon settlement with one of the tortfeasors,
the claim of the injured party is reduced by only the greater of the amount
received by it for releasing the settling tortfeasor from liability or the
amount stipulated in the settlement agreement.26 Therefore, absent the
discharge of a greater portion of its claim by settlement stipulation, the
injured party can recover all of its losses in the form of settlement pay-
ments plus the judgment against the nonsettling defendants.
The 1955 Act, however, has one serious drawback. Since tortfeasors will
generally settle for less than their proportionate share of the liability and
injured parties are usually unwilling to discharge a greater portion of their
claim than the amount received in settlement, the burden of compensating
the injured party often shifts fiom those wrongdoers who settle to those
who do not. The 1955 settlement rule may thus defeat the primary pur-
pose of contribution; namely, the equitable distribution of the burden of
paying damages among all jointly liable parties.
23. As an exception to the general rule, a tortfeasor can avoid contributive liability if
the injured party agrees to apro rata reduction of its claim. 1939 ACT, supra note 22, § 5.
Plaintiffs' attorneys, however, have not usually been willing to agree to reductions of claims.
See 1955 ACT, supra note 22, § 4, Comment. The states which have adopted or partially
adopted either the 1939 or 1955 version of the Act are listed in NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 258 (1978) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM LAW
HANDBOOK]. Citations to the state statutes adopting the Acts appear in 12 U.L.A. 57 (1979
Supp.).
24. 1939 ACT, supra note 22, § 5.
25. See 1955 ACT, supra note 22, § 4, Comment.
26. 1955 ACT, supra note 22, § 4.
1980]
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The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, adopted by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1977, avoids the shifting
of the payment burden from settling to nonsettling tortfeasors by adopting
yet a third approach to the settlement issue.27 Section 6 of this Act pro-
vides that upon settlement with one tortfeasor, the injured party's claim
against other tortfeasors is automatically reduced by the amount of the
released tortfeasor's equitable share of the joint obligation. 28 Accordingly,
a settlement between the injured party and one tortfeasor cannot shift the
burden of paying for the injured party's losses from settling to nonsettling
tortfeasors. Section 6 further provides that, upon settlement with the
plaintiff a tortfeasor is not liable for contribution, thereby protecting the
tortfeasor's incentive for settlement. Under the automatic reduction of
claim provision, however, the injured party will not be fully reimbursed
for its losses unless it receives a settlement payment at least as great as the
dollar amount of the settler's share of the damages. The injured party usu-
ally cannot accurately determine this share prior to litigation and therefore
may be unaware of the amount it is sacrificing upon settlement. Moreover,
27. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT. This act is designed for use by states which
recognize the principles of comparative fault between a plaintiff and a defendant in tort
actions. It does not supersede the 1955 version of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act which is still recommended for use by states that do not apportion fault
between the opposing parties. See id (prefatory note). As of August 1978, no state had
adopted this Act. UNIFORM LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 258.
28. Two computation methods are commonly used to determine a tortfeasor's equitable
share of the obligation - a pro rata method and a comparative method. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 886 A, Comment n (1977). Thepro rata method distributes the bur-
den equally among the jointly liable tortfeasors. Id The main advantage of this method is
its simplicity - each defendant's liability is calculated by dividing the total amount of dam-
ages by the number of jointly liable defendants. The pro rata method, however, works to
the disadvantage of tortfeasors who have caused only a small portion of a plaintiff's losses
but must pay the same amount as more culpable parties. The comparative method, on the
other hand, allows a more equitable distribution of the burden by apportioning the obliga-
tion among the tortfeasors according to a prior determination of relative fault. The Uniform
Comparative Fault Act provides for the computation of contributive shares by the compara-
tive method. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, however, provides that the
contributive shares of joint tortfeasors shall be computed by the pro rata method without
consideration of relative fault. Under either act, the shares may be increased if one or more
of the jointly liable parties is insolvent or beyond the jurisdiction of the court. UNIFORM
COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 6, Comment, Illustration 10; 1955 ACT supra note 22, § 2,
Comment. Technically, the provision of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act which reduces
the plaintiff's claim upon settlement with a defendant is not contribution. Contribution enti-
tles a tortfeasor who has paid more than his share of the damages to gain reimbursement
from other jointly liable parties. See W. PROSSER supra note 8, § 50. Reduction of a plain-
tiffs claim upon settlement, on the other hand, ensures that the nonsettling defendants will
not have to pay any of the damages allocable to the settlers. In either case, however, the net
result is to limit the liability of the joint wrongdoers to each one's share of a damage award.
[Vol. 29:669
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since its claim is automatically reduced by the settling tortfeasors' shares of
the obligation, the injured party must litigate the portion of its losses at-
tributable to these wrongdoers to protect its claim against any nonsettlers.
Thus, this rule may disadvantage injured parties and deter them from set-
tling.
The difficulty of accommodating competing interests has not deterred
the majority of states from adopting contribution in tort law.29 Nonethe-
less, in most states the legislature, not the courts, has made the contribu-
tion decision,30 and the necessity of weighing competing interests in
making this decision may explain the initial reluctance of federal district
courts to adopt this doctrine in antitrust law without express or implied
legislative approval.3 '
A. Professional Beauty Supply." An Emphasis on Equity
The absence of legislative approval did not deter the court in Profes-
sional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc. 32 from holding
that antitrust violators may be entitled to contribution. In that case, a
wholesaler of cosmetic products, Professional Beauty Supply ("Profes-
sional"), named a competitor, National Beauty Supply ("National"), as the
sole defendant in a complaint charging an attempt or conspiracy to mo-
nopolize a part of trade or commerce33 in violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act.34 The complaint alleged that National's demand that La
Maur, a manufacturer of beauty supplies, grant National an exclusive
dealership had resulted in the termination of Professional as a dealer in La
Maur products.35 National, in turn, filed a third-party complaint claiming
that if it were found liable to Professional for damages, it was entitled to
contribution from La Maur.36 The district court granted La Maur's mo-
tion for dismissal of this complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.37
In a split decision, the Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the con-
tribution claim, holding that, in appropriate circumstances, joint
tortfeasors in federal antitrust actions may be entitled topro rata contribu-
29. See note 18 supra.
30. See W. PROSSER supra note 8, § 50. See also note 18 supra.
31. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
32. 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
33. Id at 1181.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
35. 594 F.2d at 1181.
36. Id
37. Id. The lower court filed no memorandum with its order of dismissal but directed
the entry of a final judgment pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
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tion among themselves.3" The court did not specify what constituted ap-
propriate circumstances, leaving this decision for case-by-case
determination by the trier of fact.39 Relying primarily on the equitable
arguments for contribution traditionally advanced in tort law, the court, in
language almost identical to that used by Dean Prosser, stated: "There is
an obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire
burden of restitution of a loss for which two parties are responsible to be
placed upon one alone because of the plaintiff's whim or spite, or his collu-
sion with the other wrongdoer."4 The court further reasoned that al-
lowing contribution in antitrust actions would enhance the deterrent effect
of the antitrust laws.4' While recognizing that the possibility of one party
being held solely liable for treble damages might deter potential violators,
the majority noted that, whenever one of several violators bore this entire
burden, the others would avoid any liability for their illegal acts.42 The
court stated that the possibility of going "scot free" could cause many par-
ties "to be more willing ...to engage in wrongful activity."43 In the
court's view, this result seemed particularly likely in instances when a pow-
erful tortfeasor could use its economic power to prevent a plaintiff from
naming it as a defendant." On balance, the court concluded that contri-
bution would ensure that all violators bore a portion of the damages, thus
enhancing the deterrent effect of antitrust statutes.45 This perceived deter-
rence led the court to state that "even intentional tortfeasors may obtain
38. 594 F.2d at 1182. The original complaint also charged that National's acts violated
Minnesota antitrust laws and constituted a tortious interference with Professional's business
relationship with La Maur. Id at 1181. In addition, if found liable on any of Professional's
claims, National sought contribution under the state antitrust laws as well as indemnifica-
tion under federal and state laws. Id The court affirmed the dismissal of its indemnifica-
tion claims under federal law, reasoning that to allow indemnification would permit federal
antitrust violators to avoid all liability for their illegal acts, thereby decreasing the deterrent
value of antitrust actions. Id at 1185-87. The court remanded the contribution and indem-
nification claims under state law, concluding that National might be able to prove facts
which would support these claims. Id at 1187-88. For an explanation of pro rata contribu-
tion, see note 28 supra.
39. 594 F.2d at 1186.
40. Id at 1185-86. This is almost a direct quote from Dean Prosser who, discussing the
rationale for contribution in tort law, stated: "There is an obvious lack of sense and justice in
a rule which permits the entire burden for a loss, for which two defendants were equally
unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone, according to the accident of
• ..the plaintiffs whim, spite, or collusion with the other wrongdoer. W. PROSSER,
supra note 8, § 50, at 307.
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contribution so that [other] tortfeasors will not escape liability."46
The court summarily rejected other policy arguments against contribu-
tion in antitrust actions. Although the issue of contribution from settling
tortfeasors was not directly before it, the court noted that, in an appropri-
ate case, the judiciary "should be able to fashion a rule of contribution
which will protect the rights of settling defendants."47 The court also con-
sidered the dangers of increased complexity and the plaintiff's loss of con-
trol over its case engendered by a defendant's impleading of multiple
parties to seek contribution. Acknowledging that these were serious con-
cerns, the court nonetheless expressed confidence in the ability of district
court judges to avoid these problems by severing parties and issues where
necessary.48 Dissenting in part, Judge Hanson, however, stressed that even
if district court judges could alleviate these problems through their sever-
ance powers, the mere possibility of increased complexity could have a
chilling effect on an injured party's incentive to bring a meritorious ac-
tion.49 He therefore concluded that the adoption of contribution was inap-
propriate under federal antitrust laws."
The scope of the holding in Professional Beauty Supply is unclear. Since
the court expressly stated that even intentional violators may be entitled to
contribution and left the decision to the trier of fact, the holding provides
authority for allowing contribution in every private antitrust action.51 No-
tably, however, the Professional Beauty Supply court did not rule that con-
tribution was necessarily appropriate in the case before it; it only held that,
since contribution was possibly appropriate, the district court erred in dis-
missing the contribution claim as a matter of law. Moreover, the third
party complaint asserted a contribution claim against an unnamed, nonset-
46. Id. at 1186.
47. Id. at 1184.
48. Id at 1184-85. The court also rebutted the arguments raised in earlier district court
decisions that Congress intended to deny the right to contribution to antitrust violators and
that there is no right to contribution among tortfeasors under federal common law which
governs the rights of parties in federal antitrust litigation. Id. at 1182-83. See also note 9
supra.
49. Id. at 1189-90. Possible procedures for determining contributive liability are dis-
cussed at notes 103-12 and accompanying text infra.
50. Id at 1190. Judge Hanson also considered the adoption of contribution particularly
inappropriate since the original complaint alleged an intentional violation of antitrust laws.
Id at 1189-90.
51. One district court judge in the Eighth Circuit has apparently adopted this view. See
Letter from Thomas Eisele, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas, to the parties in Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., Nos. 76-C-41,
C-77-126, and C-77-108 (Oct. 1, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Letter from Judge Eisele]. For a
brief discussion of this case and Judge Eisele's letter, see notes 135-39 and accompanying
text infra.
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tling party. Thus, the holding may be construed as merely recognizing the
possibility that, in a limited number of circumstances, a defendant may be
entitled to contribution from nonsettling violators. 2
B. Abraham Construction:- Fears of Decreased Deterrence and Added
Complexity
In Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp. v. Texas Industries, Inc. " the
Fifth Circuit rejected even a narrow construction of Professional Beauty
Supply, holding that under federal laws antitrust violators never have a
right to contribution. 4 In Abraham Construction, the Wilson P. Abraham
Construction Corporation (Abraham) brought a treble damage action
naming Texas Industries (Texas) as the sole defendant and alleging that
Texas and certain unnamed coconspirators had conspired to raise and sta-
bilize the price of ready-mix concrete in the New Orleans area55 in viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act.56 Texas filed a third-party complaint
against three of the unnamed coconspirators, seeking contribution should
it be found liable to Abraham for damages.5 ' The district court granted
the third-party defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. 8
On appeal, the court, in a split decision, affirmed the dismissal of the
third-party complaint, holding that there is no right of contribution under
federal antitrust laws. 9 Although the court stated that it had carefully
considered the arguments in the majority's opinion in Professional Beauty
Supply,6° a thorough discussion of the equitable arguments that had
formed the basis for that court's holding is noticeably absent from the
Abraham Construction opinion. Instead, the court emphasized the possible
adverse effects that contribution might have on the implementation of an-
titrust statutes. The court identified two areas of particular concern. First,
52. Distinguishing Professional Beauty Supply on its facts, district judges outside the
Eighth Circuit have dismissed claims for contribution. See, e.g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust
Litigation, J.P.M.D.L. No. 323, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 1979) (settling defendants
outside the scope of ProfessionalBeauty Supply); In re Ampicillin Litigation, J.P.M.D.L. No.
50, slip op. at 6 (E.D. Pa. May 21, 1979) (Professional Beauty Supply only applicable where
contribution would further deterrent effect of antitrust laws by preventing violators not
named as defendants from avoiding all liability for their acts).
53. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979).
54. Id at 899.
55. Id
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
57. 604 F.2d at 899.
58. Id
59. Id
60. Id at 900.
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it noted that, according to prevailing economic theory, the slight prospect
of a large loss is a greater deterrent to action by businessmen than the
strong prospect of a small loss.6 Thus, the court concluded that the possi-
ble imposition of sole liability on one of many jointly and severally liable
violators without contribution strengthened the deterrent value of treble
damage actions.62 Second, the court feared that the use of severance
power was inadequate to combat the potential multiplication of issues and
parties stemming from the impleading of numerous third-party contribu-
tion defendants.63 Citing Judge Hanson's dissent in Professional Beauty
Supply, the court reasoned that the mere possibility of the district court's
prudent exercise of discretionary severance power was insufficient to
counteract the chilling effect that potential added complexity would have
on an injured party's incentive to bring a meritorious action.64
The court viewed these arguments against contribution as applying with
equal force to both intentional and unintentional antitrust violators.
While recognizing that imposition of sole liability on an unintentional vio-
lator might seem harsh, the court stated that drawing a distinction between
intentional and unintentional violators would be a distortion of antitrust
laws unjustified by a "problematic inequity."65 In closing, the court indi-
cated that its holding was subject to reasonable contrary arguments but
stated that Congress was a more appropriate forum for evaluating the
61. Id at 901. See also K. ELZINGA & W. BRETr, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES 120-29
(1976); Note, supra note 9, at 702-03.
62. 604 F.2d at 901.
63. Id at 905. See also notes 106-12 and accompanying text infra.
64. 604 F.2d at 905. Texas Industries also argued that the denial of contribution was
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's rejection in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 140 (1968), of the inpari delicto defense in antitrust actions. The
in pari delicto defense bars the plaintiff from bringing an action where it shares with the
defendant a similar responsibility for its own injury. Id. at 138. The Abraham Construction
court noted that the partial rejection of the in pari delicto defense in Perma Life would
enhance the deterrent effect of antitrust actions by increasing the pool of potential private
plaintiffs and was therefore consistent with the denial of contribution. 604 F.2d at 902-03.
The court also rejected arguments that the denial of contribution violated the doctrines of
due process and equal protection, noting that a rule of joint and several liability was ration-
ally related to the congressional objective of deterring antitrust violations. Id at 903-05.
65. Id. at 906. Judge Morgan, dissenting in part, noted the trend toward contribution
among unintentional tortfeasors and concluded that, in the interest of fairness, unintentional
antitrust violators should be extended this right. Id at 906-07 (Morgan, J., dissenting in
part). Moreover, he found the majority's deterrence arguments inconclusive, particularly
with respect to those unintentional violators who do not realize they are violating the law.
Id at 907. Finally, in view of the power of trial judges to sever trials whenever a plaintiff is
prejudiced by a defendant's expansion of his suit, he doubted that injured parties would be
discouraged from bringing treble damage actions. Id at 908.
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competing interests and policies involved.66
C S 1468 A Specific Proposal
The recent introduction of S. 1468 presents the first legislative attempt to
address the issue of contribution in antitrust actions. This bill would effec-
tively limit the liability of each antitrust violator involved in a price-fixing
agreement 67 to three times the actual damages attributable to its own sales
and purchases. Section 41(b) of the bill provides that, upon settlement
with any jointly liable price-fixer, the claim of the injured party must be
reduced by the greatest of the settlement payments, the amount stipulated
in the release, or three times the actual damages attributable to the sales or
purchases of the settling violator. 68 While providing that settling violators
extinguish their liability for contribution claims, 69 the bill would allow the
assertion of contribution claims among nonsettling violators in either the
66. Id at 906. In Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979] 2 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 62,995 (10th Cir. 1979), a split decision handed down after Abraham Construction,
a second United States Court of Appeals concluded that no right to contribution exists
among joint antitrust violators under federal antitrust statutes or under federal common law
and that Congress did not intend such a right in antitrust actions. Id at 79,700-02. This
rationale harks back to early district court decisions on this issue. See note 9 supra. The
court also reviewed the arguments raised in Professional Beauty Supply as well as in Abra-
ham Construction and concluded that "[blefore entering such a complex policy thicket, ...
this court should await a clear signal, at least, from the legislative branch of our government
on the matter." [1979] 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 79,702-04.
67. An agreement, combination, or conspiracy with the purpose or effect of raising, de-
pressing, or stabilizing prices is aper se unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, 224-28, 224 n.59 (1940). The "rule of reason," under which the factfinder weighs
all the circumstances of a case to determine whether a restrictive practice is an unreasonable
restraint of trade, is the prevailing standard of analysis under § I of the Sherman Act. See
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). Per se violations,
however, are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable because of their manifestly anticom-
petitive effect. Id at 49-50. In addition to incurring civil liability, violators of § 1 of the
Sherman Act are subject to criminal penalties for a felony offense. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See
generally Garvey, The Sherman Act and the Vicious Will: Developing Standards/or Criminal
Intent in Sherman Act Prosecutions, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 389 (1980). S. 1468 is limited to
price-fixers; it would not apply to other antitrust violators.
68. The provisions of the bill would apply to both private and parens patriae treble
damage actions brought under §§ 4(b) and (c) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15b-c (1976),
as well as civil actions brought by the United States for single damages under § 4a of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1976). S. 1468, § 41(a), 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC.
8931 (1979). In single damage actions, the actual damages would not be trebled in reducing
a plaintiffs claim. Id Technically, the claim reduction provision of S. 1468 is not contribu-
tion but rather an alternative method of limiting the liability of joint tortfeasors. See note
28 supra.
69. S. 1468, § 41(c), 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 125 CONG. REC. 8931 (1979).
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plaintiffs original suit or a subsequent action.7°
Proponents of S. 1468 argue that it's liability limiting provisions are nec-
essary to relieve the coercive pressure to settle that presently exists in price-
fixing actions. 7' Since only the dollar amount of settlement payments is
deducted from a later treble damage judgment against nonsettling defend-
ants, there is an increased risk of disproportionate liability for nonsettling
defendants whenever a jointly liable violator settles for an amount less
than its share of the damages.72 Supporters of S. 1468 contend that often
larger and more culpable defendants are anxious to settle and reach early,
inexpensive settlement agreements with the plaintiffs for amounts far less
than their share of the damages. 73 Then, as the remaining defendants' ex-
posure to liability increases,7 4 plaintiffs will insist on more expensive settle-
ment terms.75 This increased risk of liability exerts pressure on the smaller
nonsettling defendants who, convinced of their innocence or relative lack
of culpability, initially resisted settlement.76 Eventually, these smaller and
possibly innocent defendants may enter into settlement agreements on the
more expensive terms offered to late settlers rather than risk an unfavora-
ble judgment for treble damages and the possible loss of bank financing
caused by exposure to extensive liability.77 Thus, by limiting the liability
of violators, S. 1468 presumably would benefit the smaller and less culpa-
ble defendants disadvantaged by the present liability and settlement rules.
Proponents of S. 1468 also claim that it would have only minimal ad-
verse effects on the implementation of antitrust laws. During the hearings
on the bill, they argued that, even without the possibility of sole liability,
the high risks involved in fully litigating the cases provide adequate incen-
tives for both plaintiffs and defendants to settle.78 Moreover, by providing
that contribution claims could be asserted in either the original or a subse-
70. Since the right to contribution pertains only to tortfeasors who share a common
liability, a determination of joint liability either in the plaintiffs original action or a separate
contribution action is necessary. See W. PROSSER supra note 8, § 50.
71. See, e.g., Hearings on S 1468, supra note 7, at 45-46, 66-68 (prepared statements of
Thomas R. Long and Donald G. Kempf, Jr.); Letter from Senator Bayh to Members of the
United States Senate (Aug. 8, 1979).
72. See notes 3-5 and accompanying text supra.
73. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1468, supra note 7, at 45-46, 66-68, 127-31 (prepared state-
ments of Thomas R. Long, Donald Kempf, Jr., and George Kress).
74. See notes 3-5 and accompanying text supra.
75. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1468, supra note 7, at 45-46, 66-68, 127-31 (prepared state-
ments of Thomas R. Long, Donald Kempf, Jr., and George Kress).
76. Id.
77. Id
78. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1468, supra note 7, at 121 (prepared statement of Don T.
Hibner, Jr.).
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quent action, the bill theoretically would permit adequate judicial control
over the problems associated with the impleading of numerous third-party
defendants.79
II. CONTRIBUTION IN ANTITRUST ACTIONS: EQUITY AND FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY
The conflicting decisions in Professional Beauty Supply and Abraham
Construction rest more on intuitive value judgments than reasoned analy-
sis. This suggests that resolution of the contribution issue requires a bal-
ancing of its anticipated equitable benefits against its potential adverse
effects on antitrust policy. In Professional Beauty Supply, the court's per-
ception of the unfairness of joint and several liability led to the adoption of
contribution without more than summary attention to its possible adverse
impact on the implementation of antitrust laws.8" Conversely, in Abraham
Construction, fear of adverse effects caused the court to reject contribution
in antitrust actions without a careful consideration of its possible equitable
benefits.8 A closer examination of the equitable arguments favoring con-
tribution and the possible methods for effectuating the doctrine in antitrust
litigation will describe the parameters within which this issue should be
decided.
A. The Equitable Arguments
A major factor influencing the court's decision in Professional Beauty
Supply was its perception of the unfairness of allowing the entire burden
of restitution to be placed on one of several joint tortfeasors merely be-
cause of the plaintiffs whim, spite, or collusion with the other violators. 2
The weight of this argument, however, varies according to the deliberate-
ness and the nature of the wrongdoer's act. Although it may appear unjust
to place the entire burden of compensation on one of several unintentional
tortfeasors, an individual who purposefully injures another seems less de-
serving of ameliorative consideration. For this reason, contribution in tort
law is usually denied to intentional tortfeasors.83 In Professional Beauty
Supply, however, the court found that both intentional and unintentional
antitrust violators may be entitled to contribution. 4 One reason why the
79. See S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1979] ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA), No. 942 at 7-8 (Special Supp.).
80. See notes 38-48 and accompanying text supra.
81. See notes 59-66 and accompanying text supra.
82. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
83. See notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
84. 594 F.2d at 1186.
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court did not restrict contribution to unintentional violators may have
been the practical difficulties in fashioning a workable rule to distinguish
intentional and unintentional violators in antitrust law. Although the dis-
tinction between intentional and unintentional acts is fairly clear in tort
law,85 this distinction in antitrust law is rather clouded. For example, a
participant in an agreement which has either the purpose or effect of rais-
ing prices may incur civil liability for price-fixing.86 Thus, whether a
price-fixer should be classified as an intentional or unintentional antitrust
violator may depend on the evidence in a given case rather than the type of
offense. It appears, therefore, that limiting contribution to unintentional
antitrust violators would require either a revised statutory definition of an-
titrust violations or the determination of eligibility for contribution on a
case-by-case basis.
While the court in Professional Beauty Supply emphasized the benefits
of contribution to antitrust violators, proponents of S. 1468 argue that con-
tribution is necessary mainly to protect innocent or less culpable defend-
ants in price-fixing cases. Supporters of the proposed legislation argue that
the tendency of the more culpable and economically powerful defendants
to seek early settlements with the plaintiffs on relatively inexpensive terms
creates coercive pressure which forces less culpable and even innocent de-
fendants to settle on the more costly terms offered later in the litigation.87
There is little evidence, however, to support this view,88 and it seems in-
consistent with sound litigation strategy. First, plaintiffs are usually reluc-
tant to jeopardize their recovery by settling with those violators with the
financial ability to pay large judgments while litigating against financially
weaker violators.89 Similarly, plaintiffs would normally be unwilling to
undergo the expense of litigating a claim against a party it knew or sus-
pected to be innocent since the chances for a favorable outcome would be
slight. In fact, it is not unusual for plaintiffs to offer less expensive settle-
ment terms to less culpable or financially sound defendants. 90 Moreover,
85. See W. PROSSER, supra note 8, §§ 7, 28.
86. See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 906 n. 1
(5th Cir. 1979) (Morgan, J., dissenting in part). See also note 67 supra.
87. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1468, supra note 7, at 44-45, 120-21 (prepared statements of
George Kress and Don T. Hibner, Jr.). See also notes 3-5 and accompanying text supra.
88. John Shenefield, the Assistant United States Attorney General in charge of the An-
titrust Division of the Justice Department, testified at the hearings on S. 1468 that he recal-
led no evidence of this problem being presented during his tenure as chairman of the
National Commission for Review of Antitrust Laws. Hearings on S. 1468, supra note 7, at 6.
89. Id at 29 (prepared statement of John Shenefield).
90. Mr. Harold Kohn, attorney for the plaintiffs in the Folding Carton antitrust litiga-
tion, testified that defendant Georgia-Pacific settled for $500,000 while earlier settling de-
fendants had paid over $25,000,000. He stated that the reason the plaintiffs settled with
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while the price of settlement may be higher for many late settlers, plaintiffs
often offer less expensive early settlement terms to all defendants. 9' Thus,
defendants who refuse to settle until pressured by the predictable increase
in exposure to liability may be penalized by their own errors in judgment
rather than by the plaintiffs' design.
Although putatively designed for the benefit of innocent or less culpable
defendants, by automatically reducing the plaintiffs' claims by the amount
of any settling violator's share of the joint obligation, S. 1468 would elimi-
nate the settlement pressure not only for innocent but also for the most
culpable parties. Such a broad remedy is inappropriate if the true purpose
of the bill is to protect less culpable or innocent antitrust defendants. If, on
the other hand, the bill is also designed to protect intentional and criminal
violators of antitrust laws, 92 one can question whether these violators de-
serve such protection. Nonetheless, to the extent that less culpable defend-
ants are presently forced to enter into unjust settlement agreements, there
is strong justification for a narrower remedy which would benefit only
these defendants. Thus, while a broad rule of contribution may be inap-
propriate, this doctrine might be justified if its benefits were restricted to
less culpable antitrust defendants through a case-by-case eligibility deter-
mination.
B Policy Considerations and Methodsfor Applying Contribution in
Antitrust Actions
Before adopting the doctrine of contribution in antitrust litigation, as in
tort law, careful consideration must be given to several factors, including
fairness to the parties, the promotion of settlements, and judicial economy.
The special role of the private antitrust action as a mechanism for enforc-
ing federal law, however, adds yet another dimension to the analysis. The
Georgia-Pacific on relatively inexpensive terms was their belief that they had a weak case
against the defendant. Hearings on S. 1468, supra note 7, at 108. Similarly, in the Corru-
gated Container litigation, the plaintiffs settled with some financially weak defendants on
relatively inexpensive terms. A chart listing the market shares, net income, net working
capital, and terms of settling and nonsettling defendants in the Corrugated Container case
illustrates that the settlement terms were not necessarily more expensive for late settlers. In
particular, Consolidated Packaging Corporation, one of the financially weaker defendants,
settled for $. 18 million per percentage point share of the market, while financially stronger
and earlier settling defendants had paid from 4 to $6.5 million per percentage point share of
the market for release by the plaintiffs. Id at 181-84.
91. See, e.g., Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., No. 75-23-N, slip op. at 4 (M.D. Ala.
May 19, 1979).
92. S. 1468 is limited in scope to members of a price-fixing agreement. Price-fixing,
however, is aper se violation of antitrust law, subject to criminal penalties, and often inten-
tional. See note 67 supra.
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treble damage provision of section 4 of the Clayton Act 9 3 serves both as a
special incentive to "private attorneys general" 94 to instigate litigation and
as a deterrent to potential antitrust violators.95 Since it is impossible for
the government to detect every violation of the antitrust laws, the deterrent
effect of private suits is critical to achieving the goal of free and unfettered
competition. 96 Although the courts in Professional Beauty Supply and
Abraham Construction both recognized this point, they differed in their
views concerning the effect of contribution on the deterrent value of pri-
vate antitrust suits. The Professional Beauty Supply court concluded that
the distribution of liability among the violators through contribution
would be more likely to dissuade a potential violator from engaging in
anticompetitive behavior than the risk of bearing sole liability for jointly
caused damages. 97 This conclusion is warranted when an economically
powerful violator has foreknowledge that the party who will be injured by
its illegal acts will not name it as a defendant in a later suit.98 Past experi-
ence, however, suggests that such foreknowledge is rare. More often, in-
jured parties are overinclusive rather than underinclusive in naming
defendants.99 Moreover, if without contribution a violator can use its eco-
nomic power to prevent an injured party from naming it as a defendant,
with contribution the same violator might be able to force the injured
party to forego bringing an action at all since only in this way could the
violator avoid contributive liability. The net result of contribution in such
circumstances would be the avoidance of liability by all the violators and a
lessening of the deterrent value of antitrust actions.
The Abraham Construction court's conclusion that the possibility of sole
liability for a treble damage judgment provides a greater deterrent than the
increased possibility of liability for smaller amounts appears to be valid."o
As noted by the court, this conclusion is consistent with the prevailing eco-
nomic theory that businessmen are generally adverse to risks.' °' More-
over, proponents of S. 1468 inadvertently lent support to this theory by
arguing that even a slight risk of sole liability for extensive damages may
93. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
94. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972).
95. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977).
96. See Fortner v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969).
97. 594 F.2d at 1185. See also notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
98. 594 F.2d at 1185.
99. See Hearings on S 1468, supra note 7, at 67 (prepared testimony of Donald G.
Kempf, Jr.).
100. 604 F.2d at 901. See also notes 61-62 and accompanying text supra.
101. 604 F.2d at 901.
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force an innocent defendant to settle with the plaintiff.' 2
The deterrent effect of private antitrust actions, however, depends not
only on a potential violator's perception of risk but also on the incentives
for injured parties to bring suit. Although the prospect of recovering treble
damages is a strong incentive for instigating an antitrust action, it is not the
only factor considered by plaintiffs before instituting litigation. Prospec-
tive plaintiffs must also consider the cost of litigation and the probability
of success. Thus, the anticipated complexity of litigation and ease of ob-
taining settlement are important factors in the decisionmaking process.
Accordingly, if contribution in treble damage actions would markedly in-
crease the complexity of antitrust litigation or the difficulty of obtaining
settlement, it would lessen the incentive for and deterrent value of private
antitrust actions.
I Proceduresfor Determining Liability
The extent to which contribution would add to the complexity of anti-
trust litigation and deter parties from settlement depends in large measure
upon what rules might be adopted for defining the effect of settlement,'
0 3
computating contributive shares," ° and determining joint liability."' A
consideration of the tort law procedures for determining joint liability il-
lustrates some of the potential problems of implementing contribution in
complex antitrust litigation. Joint liability, a prerequisite to contribution,
may be determined either in the plaintiff's action or a separate action."
In In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation,1°7 a post-Professional
Beauty Supply decision, Judge Singleton denied the motions of some of
the fourteen nonsettling defendants to amend their answers to assert cross-
claims for contribution against the twenty-three defendants who had previ-
ously settled with the plaintiff class.'" 8 As the court noted, it would be
102. One proponent of S. 1468 impliedly admitted that joint and several liability without
contribution is a deterrent to potential antitrust violators, but contended that the sanctions of
treble damages, fines, and jail terms in antitrust laws were by themselves sufficient to deter
violations. Hearings on S 1468, supra note 7, at 120 (prepared statement of Don T. Hibner,
Jr.).
103. See notes 23-28 and accompanying text supra.
104. See note 28 supra.
105. See note 70 supra.
106. Id
107. [1979] 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) $ 62,689 (S.D. Tex.), ai'dmem., 606 F.2d 319
(5th Cir. 1979). This case was often cited in the hearings on S. 1468. Two persons who
testified in favor of the bill, George Kress (the owner of a late settling defendant company)
and Thomas Long (the attorney for a nonsettling defendant company which asserted contri-
bution claims), were directly involved in the litigation.
108. Id at 77,879.
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virtually impossible to manage antitrust litigation "with the class and opt-
out plaintiffs and thirty-seven defendants asserting cross-claims against
each other."'1 9 In a case such as Corrugated Container, the added com-
plexity resulting from contribution claims would cause the plaintiffs to lose
control over their case, confuse the trier of fact, and make the litigation far
more costly and time-consuming for the parties and the courts. Thus,
plaintiffs would be reluctant to institute litigation, and the deterrent value
of private antitrust actions would be diminished.
Many of the problems which might result from the assertion of multiple
contribution claims in a plaintiffs original action would not be eliminated
by determining joint liability in a separate action. The period from the
commencement of a private antitrust action until its final disposition at
trial often exceeds five years." ° If separate contribution actions were
equally time-consuming, the duplicative efforts of relitigating several of
the issues presented in the original action would place a great burden on
the resources of the courts and the parties. In addition, the running of the
statute of limitations could preclude a later contribution action. To protect
a defendant's right to contribution, the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act provides a one year statute of limitations for separate con-
tribution actions which does not start to run until after payment of the
judgment in the original action."' In effect, this rule extends the statutory
period of liability for tortfeasors not named in the original action. If an
antitrust defendant were allowed to file a separate contribution action
within one year of the payment of the judgment in the original case, an
alleged violator not named in the original action could conceivably be
forced to defend itself for the first time in a contribution action commenc-
ing ten or more years after its alleged illegal behavior." 2 The passage of
109. Id
110. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, RE-
PORT TO THE PRESIDENT 15 n.1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST COMMISSION RE-
PORT]. According to the 1977 figures of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, the median time period from filing a complaint to final disposition of private anti-
trust actions that went to trial was 44 months; 10% of these cases took longer than 68 months.
Id
111. 1955 ACT, supra note 22, § 3.
112. The statute of limitations for private antitrust actions under federal law is four
years. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Assuming an action is commenced at the end of this four-year
period, and adding five years for disposition plus one more year for the commencement of a
contribution action, an alleged joint violator not named in the original action could be
forced to defend against an antitrust violation for the first time 10 years after its occurrence.
This problem could be compounded if the private action followed a government criminal
action which, under 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1976), tolls the statute of limitations on private ac-
tions.
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so long a period of time could substantially impair the ability of a defend-
ant in such an action to obtain the accurate information regarding an al-
leged offense necessary for the preparation of an adequate defense.
2. Computation of Contributive Shares
The complexity of much antitrust litigation would also augment the dif-
ficulties which arise in computing contributive shares. In tort law, contrib-
utive shares are either divided equally among the jointly liable parties
under the pro rata method of computation or apportioned among the par-
ties according to their relative fault under a comparative method." 3 The
difficulty of apportioning fault and allocating damages increases as the
number of defendants increases. Apportionment of fault and damages
among the thirty-seven defendants in Corrugated Container, for example,
might be an impossible task. The mechanical allocation of damages ac-
cording to market share under the provisions of S. 1468' 14 seems simpler
than assigning degrees of culpability. Nonetheless, the bill would require a
market share allocation of damages in every price-fixing case that went to
trial, thereby substantially increasing the complexity of litigation involving
numerous parties." 15
Cognizant of the potential difficulty of apportioning damages on a com-
parative basis among several defendants, the court in Professional Beauty
Supply adopted a pro rata method for computing contributive shares. 16
This method, in a case such as Corrugated Container, would also have seri-
ous drawbacks. The estimated amount of treble damages in that case was
one billion dollars," 17 and the sales of the thirty-seven defendants ranged
from .375% to 8.56% of the relevant market. 1 8 If a billion dollar damage
award were apportioned according to market share, the company with the
smallest share of the market would pay $3.75 million while the company
113. See note 28 supra.
114. See notes 67-70 and accompanying text supra. The claim reduction provisions of S.
1468 have been criticized as being without precedent in law. See REP. No. 428, 96th Cong.
1st Sess. 36, reprinled in [1979] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), No. 942 at 12 (Spe-
cial Supp.). See also note 27 supra.
115. Pursuant to § 41(a)-(c) of this bill, a computation of the amount of damages attribu-
table to each jointly liable violator, whether named as a defendant or not, would be neces-
sary either to determine the amount of contribution due from each one or the amount by
which the plaintifis claim should be reduced as a result of settlement with some of the
violators.
116. 594 F.2d at 1182 & n.4. Thepro rata method is discussed at note 28 supra.
117. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, [1979] 2 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 62,689, at 77,879 (S.D. Tex.), affidmem., 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.1979). Treble dam-
age estimates ranged from $600 million to over $3 billion. Id
118. Hearings on S. 1468, supra note 7, at 181-84.
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with the largest share would pay $85.6 million. If these damages were
apportioned equally among thirty-seven defendants pursuant to apro rata
method of computation, each company would have to pay approximately
thirty million dollars. Thus, compared to a market share allocation of
damages, thepro rata method would permit the company with the largest
market share to avoid approximately fifty-five million dollars in damages
while forcing the company with the smallest market share to pay approxi-
mately twenty-six million dollars in additional damages. Damages so dis-
tributed through contribution could make the larger companies more
willing to violate antitrust laws since they would avoid much of the liabil-
ity attributable to their own illegal acts. At the same time, the dispropor-
tionate payment burden placed on smaller companies under this method
could conceivably force them out of business, thereby lessening competi-
tion in the relevant market.' 19 Consequently, both methods of apportion-
ing shares of contribution could have a substantial detrimental impact on
federal antitrust policy.
Not all antitrust actions, however, are as complex as the Corrugated
Container litigation. In a case such as Professional Beauty Supply, for ex-
ample, the choice of procedures for determining contributive liability and
computing contributive shares would not have serious antitrust conse-
quences. In such a situation, the possible adverse effects of contribution on
antitrust policy become less compelling reasons for the denial of contribu-
tion. If the right to contribution were determined on the case-by-case basis
adopted in Professional Beauty Supply, presumably these adverse effects
would be a factor in the decision to allow contribution and the election of
a method for applying this doctrine in the most equitable manner. 2 °
3. Settlement Rules
While a consideration of the diverse rules for determining joint liability
and computing contributive shares is essential to an assessment of whether
antitrust violators should be entitled to contribution, the ultimate resolu-
119. In Professional Beauty Supply, the court argued that the pro rata method might
strengthen the deterrent value of antitrust laws since, under the comparative fault method,
parties who had participated in an illegal scheme in a minor capacity would feel they had
little to lose. 594 F. 2d at 1182 n.4. Compared with the potential adverse effects of the pro
rata method, however, deterrence of minor violators seems relatively unimportant.
120. As an alternative to S. 1468, Senators Kennedy and Metzenbaum have suggested
that the following sentence be added to §§ 4, 4A, and 4C of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
15, 15A, and 15C (1976): "Nothing in this section shall be construed to bar contribution
among persons found liable for damages under antitrust laws." S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 14, reprinted in [1979] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 942, at 14 (Spe-
cial Supp.). The added sentence would allow the judiciary to apply contribution in a limited
number of antitrust suits on a case-by-case basis. Id at 13-14.
1980l
Catholic University Law Review
tion of this issue will probably depend on the ability of the courts or the
legislature to fashion appropriate settlement rules.' 2' A settlement rule
modeled after the 1939 version of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act' 22 would allow nonsettling defendants to limit their liabil-
ity by obtaining contribution from settling defendants and thereby elimi-
nating the coercive pressure for settlement that presently exists in antitrust
actions. Under such a rule, however, antitrust defendants would have little
incentive to settle since they might still be liable for contribution and
forced to litigate contribution claims. This lack of incentive for violators
to settle would also have a significant effect on injured parties. Since few
defendants would be apt to settle if not assured of avoiding further liability
and litigation, plaintiffs could often anticipate not only lengthy litigation
but also a substantial number of defendants. The perception of these ob-
stacles could dissuade injured parties from bringing meritorious actions,
thereby lessening the deterrent value of private antitrust suits.
In addition to this indirect anticompetitive effect, permitting contribu-
tion claims against settling defendants could have a direct anticompetitive
effect. Theoretically, a greater number of competitors results in increased
competition, lower prices for consumers, and correspondingly lower profit
margins for producers. 23 Thus, in order to ensure competitive pricing
plaintiffs, who are often customers of the defendants in an antitrust action,
will usually want the defendants to remain in business after settlement or
the payment of damages. Consequently, plaintiffs may be willing to tailor
their settlement terms to a given defendant's ability to pay.' 24  On the
other hand, codefendants are often competitors and therefore have a mo-
tive for driving one another out of business in order to lessen competition
and increase profit margins. Permitting nonsettling defendants to obtain
contribution from settling defendants would provide financially sounder
defendants with a legal means of achieving this objective whenever some
settlers lacked the ability to pay their contributive shares of a damage
award. Applied in combination with apro rata method of computing con-
121. The settlement issue has been called the Achilles heel of Professional Beauty Supply.
See Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., No. 75-23-N, slip op. at 3 (M.D. Ala. May 19, 1979).
The settlement issue was also the major area of concern among those who testified at the
hearings on S. 1468. See generally Hearings on S. 1468, supra note 7.
122. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
123. See generally P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS §§ 107-12 (2d ed. 1974).
124. See Brief for Defendant Coleman in Support of Partial Settlement at 12, Brief for
Plaintiffs in Support of Partial Settlement at 10-12, Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Nos.
76-C-41, 77-C-126 (parties to proposed settlement agreement claimed that continued
financial viability of settling defendant primary consideration in negotiations). See also
notes 89-90 and accompanying text supra.
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tributive shares, which usually works to the disadvantage of smaller de-
fendants,'25 this settlement rule could be an especially effective weapon for
bankrupting competitors.
In contrast to the settlement provisions of the 1939 Uniform Act, S. 1468
protects defendants' incentive to settle by providing that defendants who
settle extinguish liability for contribution claims. 26 By further providing
for contribution among nonsettling defendants and the automatic reduc-
tion of the plaintiffs claim upon settlement by the amount of any settling
defendant's share of the damages, S. 1468 would also effectively limit each
defendant's liability to three times the damages attributable only to its own
sales or purchases. The bill would therefore eliminate much of the coer-
cive pressure for settlement that presently exists in antitrust litigation.127
There is some doubt, however, that the bill would substantially benefit the
innocent and financially weaker defendants for whom it is putatively
designed. George Kress, the owner of a relatively small company that
reached a settlement agreement with the plaintiffs in Corrugated
Container, testified that even if its exposure to liability had been limited to
three times the damage attributable to its market share, his company
would have been forced to settle to avoid the loss of bank financing.' 2 On
the other hand, the liability limiting provisions of S. 1468 would benefit
financially stronger and possibly more culpable defendants. Some coer-
cive pressure may be necessary to induce these defendants to settle. Since
antitrust defendants pay no prejudgment interest on treble damages, 129 a
defendant can, in effect, borrow money at no interest by undergoing pro-
tracted litigation rather than reaching an early settlement agreement with
the injured party. Furthermore, just as innocent defendants face a possi-
bility of being held liable for damages, it is possible that culpable defend-
ants who litigate may be adjudged not liable. Thus, unless the sum of the
settlement amount plus anticipated interest were considerably less than the
total of the treble damages attributable to its own sales and purchases plus
estimated litigation costs, financially stronger defendants presumably
would be unwilling to settle. Plaintiffs, therefore, could anticipate either
lengthy and costly litigation or the recovery of less than the amount of
damages to which they are entitled. This prospect could weaken the incen-
125. See note 119 and accompanying text supra.
126. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
127. See notes 67-70 and accompanying text supra.
128. Hearings on S. 1468, supra note 7, at 43.
129. Prejudgment interest has generally not been allowed in treble damage actions. See
TWA, Inc. v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 80 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'don other grounds, 409 U.S. 363
(1973).
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tive to bring private antitrust actions and, as a result, the deterrent effect of
antitrust actions.
Although some defendants would have little to gain from the settlement
provisions of S. 1468, plaintiffs would have a disincentive for settlement. It
would be difficult for plaintiffs to ascertain the proportionate share of their
losses attributable to a given violator's illegal acts, an amount by which
their claim would be automatically reduced upon settlement. Moreover,
even with full knowledge of each defendant's proportionate share, plain-
tiffs would face a dilemma whenever a defendant did not have the
financial ability to pay its proportionate share of damages. In such a situa-
tion, the plaintiff could either settle with a financially weak defendant,
thereby sacrificing part of its claim, or it could seek full recovery by refus-
ing to settle, thus subjecting the defendant to the possibility of bank-
ruptcy. 3' If the financially weak defendant were an important source of
supply or a vigorous competitor, neither alternative would be attractive to
the plaintiff.
Contributing to the anticompetitive impact of the automatic reduction
of claim provision of S. 1468 is the burden placed on the plaintiffs to liti-
gate the extent of liability of any settling violators in order to protect their
claims against any nonsettlers.' 3' At trial, the nonsettling defendants
could reduce the ultimate judgment by presenting evidence that most of
the plaintiffs' losses were attributable to the settlers. Since antitrust de-
fendants charged with price-fixing are often coconspirators, the possibility
of collusion among settling and nonsettling defendants to achieve such a
result is substantial. Furthermore, in major antitrust actions involving sev-
eral defendants, the necessity of litigating the proportionate shares of lia-
bility of settling defendants would markedly increase the complexity and
costs of the suit, weakening both the incentive for injured parties to sue
and the deterrent effect of antitrust actions.
Since the reduction of claim provisions of S. 1468 would effectively limit
the liability of each defendant to three times the actual damages attributa-
ble to its own acts, the bill could also have a more direct antideterrent
effect. A potential violator could estimate with reasonable accuracy the
extent of its liability for a contemplated violation, an amount usually no
greater than three times the benefit derived from the violation.' 32 Com-
130. Even if plaintiffs collected their judgment from only financially stronger defendants,
these defendants could force financially weaker nonsettling violators to pay a proportionate
share of the damage award by asserting contribution claims against them under § 41(a) of S.
1468.
131. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
132. Subsection 41(d) of S. 1468 provides that defendants are jointly and severally liable.
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paring this estimate and an assessment of the risk of detection with the
anticipated benefit, it could decide whether the contemplated violation
would be in the company's economic self-interest. 33
It has been suggested that the problems associated with settlement rules
that reduce the injured party's claim or allow the assertion of contribution
claims against settling defendants could be eliminated by determining
whether a given antitrust violator was entitled to contribution on the case-
by-case basis espoused in Professional Beauty Suppl. 13 4  Since neither
plaintiffs nor defendants can know what they will gain or lose by settle-
ment under adhoc adjudication, however, both may be deterred from set-
tlement. In Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc.,135 an antitrust
action now pending before a district court within the Eighth Circuit, the
plaintiff class members and one of the defendants sought to eliminate this
uncertainty by conditioning a proposed settlement agreement on the oc-
currence of one of the following four alternatives: a ruling by the court
that the settling defendant was not liable to the nonsettling defendants for
contribution; an agreement by the plaintiffs to indemnify the settling de-
fendant for any contribution claims; the release of the settling defendant
from contributive liability by all the nonsettling defendants; or a ruling by
the court or an agreement by the plaintiffs that would reduce the plaintiffs'
claims by an amount sufficient to eliminate any contribution claims
against the settling defendant.' 36 The nonsettling defendants in Borden
were not willing to release the prospective settling defendant from possible
contributive liability. Apparently recognizing the implications of a case-
by-case approach to contribution, one of the nonsettling defendants argued
In terms of the amount of damages ultimately payable by a given defendant, this provision
would usually have no effect since other provisions in the bill effectively limit each violator's
liability to three times the damages attributable to its sales and purchases. See notes 67-70
and accompanying text supra. If one of the jointly liable violators were insolvent, however,
the others would be responsible for paying the damages attributable to the insolvent viola-
tor. See S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 24, reprinted in [1979] ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 942, at 9 (Special Supp.).
133. John Shenefield, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division,
viewed the possible use of such risk-benefit analysis as a significant danger if S. 1468 were
adopted. See Hearings on S. 1468, supra note 7, at 27. There is evidence that businessmen
have used this type of analysis in deciding whether to enter an illegal price-fixing agreement.
See ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, Supp. 2 & n.3 (citing Bus. WEEK 48 (June 2,
1975), quoting admissions by businessmen that criminal fines were a small price to pay for
the profits derived from price-fixing).
134. 594 F.2d at 1186.
135. Nos. 76-C-41, 77-C-126 (E.D. Ark. June 29, 1979).
136. Proposed Settlement Agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant Colemen Dair-
ies, Inc., Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., Nos. 76-C-41, 77-C-126 (E.D. Ark. June
29, 1979).
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that, before the court approved the settlement, a hearing was necessary to
determine whether settling defendants were entitled to contribution.' 3
7
Although the court did not hold such a hearing and did not actually deter-
mine whether contribution was appropriate in the case, it noted that Pro-
fessional Beauty Supply had established that there may be such a right
among antitrust violators within the Eighth Circuit. The court concluded
that, in light of Professional Beauty Supply's mandate that the judiciary
formulate rules to protect the rights of settling defendants, the only viable
proposed alternative was to reduce the claim of the plaintiff class upon
settlement. 138 The settling parties were apparently unwilling to accept
such terms but ultimately gained tentative judicial approval of the settle-
ment proposal after the plaintiffs agreed to indemnify the settler for contri-
bution claims.' 39
As Borden illustrates, determining the liability of settling defendants for
contribution on a case-by-case basis requires either the unlikely voluntary
relinquishment of rights by some of the parties or a hearing and possible
appeal each time a settlement is proposed. Each party remaining in the
action would have a stake in the outcome of such hearings. Thus, if set-
tling defendants were still liable for contribution, a case-by-case determi-
nation of contributive rights would either deter settlement or place a
substantial burden on the courts, injured parties, and relatively blameless
as well as culpable defendants.
C A Limited Right to Contribution
The settlement rule of the 1955 version of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act' 4 ° would avoid the disincentive to settlement and
the anticompetitive effect of the other settlement procedures. Under this
rule, which parallels the current procedure in antitrust litigation, 4' de-
fendants who settle in good faith extinguish their liability for contribution.
Since the court in Professional Beauty Supply reserved the formulation of
specific settlement rules for later decisions,'42 it is possible that the Eighth
137. Brief of Defendant Foremost-McKesson Pertaining to Proposed Settlement Agree-
ment Between Plaintiffs and Defendant Colemen Dairy, Inc., Little Rock School Dist. v.
Borden, Inc., Nos. 76-C-41, 77-C-126 (E.D. Ark. June 29, 1979).
138. Letter from Judge Eisele note 51 supra.
139. Telephone conversation with the Clerk of the Court for the District Court in the
Eastern District of Arkansas (December 21, 1979).
140. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra.
141. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 348 (1971);
Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 397-98 (9th Cir. 1957). There is no requirement of
good faith, however, under the present settlement procedures in antitrust litigation.
142. 594 F.2d at 1184. As an example of a rule which would protect the rights of settling
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Circuit and courts following that precedent will adopt such a rule. Al-
though this rule would limit the scope of contribution to the nonsettling
defendants, it would not completely eliminate contribution among anti-
trust violators. In a factual situation similar to the one alleged in Profes-
sional Beauty Supply, a named defendant could still obtain contribution
from unnamed coviolators.
Limiting the scope of contributions to nonsettling defendants is still sub-
ject to the criticisms of the present settlement rule - it allows the shifting
of the burden of compensating plaintiffs from settling to nonsettling de-
fendants and creates undue coercive pressure for settlement.1 43 Ease of
settlement, it is argued, is not sufficient justification for a rule which per-
mits such inequity. The judiciary, however, already has tools other than
contribution at its disposal to prevent an unjust shifting of the burden of
compensating injured parties. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pres-
ently require judicial approval of proposed settlement agreements in class
action litigation.' 44 If judicial approval of settlement agreements were re-
quired in all treble damage antitrust litigation, and if judges carefully scru-
tinized proposed settlement agreements to ensure that the parties had
exercised good faith, much of the potential inequity of the present settle-
ment rule in antitrust litigation could be obviated. Furthermore, the flex-
ibility of such a rule would allow judges to protect innocent and financially
weaker defendants without causing undue detriment to injured parties and
the goals of antitrust laws. If needed, additional protection could be pro-
vided for innocent defendants by enacting legislation creating sanctions for
a plaintiffs institution of sham antitrust litigation. 145
An additional benefit of limiting contribution to nonsettlers would be
that a case-by-case determination of whether contribution was appropriate
could then be used to further restrict the benefits of contribution to only
deserving parties without causing many of the problems such a determina-
tion would entail under a broader rule applying contribution to settling as
well as nonsettling violators. 46  Although the contribution issue would
still be contested, litigation would be less frequent than under a broader
rule since contribution would only be an issue in the rare situations where
defendants, the court cited Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321,
348 (1971), which sets forth the settlement rule currently used in antitrust litigation. Id
143. See notes 71-77 and accompanying text supra.
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
145. See Hearings on S. 1468, supra note 7, at 29 (prepared statement of John
Shenefield).
146. See notes 134-39 and accompanying text supra.
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plaintiffs failed to name all potentially liable parties as defendants. 14 7
Moreover, in appropriate circumstances, the court could consider the con-
tribution claim in a separate action so that no additional burden would be
placed on the plaintiff. Finally, the court could initially limit the issue in
such a hearing to the moral turpitude of the defendant asserting the contri-
bution claims.
III. CONCLUSION
The equitable arguments raised in Professional Beauty Supply and re-
jected in Abraham Construction are not sufficiently compelling to justify a
broad rule of contribution such as the one proposed in S. 1468. Since eq-
uity must serve not only participants in an illegal agreement but also inno-
cent parties injured by such an agreement, the promotion of a fairer
distribution of the burden of paying damages among persons guilty of in-
tentional, criminal, andper se violations of antitrust statutes is not justified
if it is achieved at the expense of the goals of antitrust laws. Regardless of
the method used to apply this doctrine, a broad rule of contribution in
complex litigation would almost certainly have an adverse effect on the
rights of injured parties and the interests furthered by antitrust laws. Even
a case-by-case definition of the scope of the doctrine, if applicable to set-
tling parties, would hinder the settlement process and adversely affect anti-
trust policy. Closer judicial supervision of settlement rather than
contribution may more effectively minimize the coercive pressure for set-
tlement now present in antitrust litigation.
As an exception to a general rule barring contribution, however, a lim-
ited right of contribution among only nonsettling violators may be justi-
fied. A case-by-case determination could be used to effectuate such a
limited rule of contribution in litigation where it would benefit relatively
blameless defendants without causing undue harm to injured parties or
antitrust goals. Thus, the holding in Professional Beauty Supply, if nar-
rowly construed, may further the interests of equity without detracting
from the effectiveness of antitrust laws.
Sandy deLone
147. See note 99 and accompanying text supra. Although plaintiffs generally name all
potentially liable parties, Professional Beauty Supply, Abraham Construction, and Olson
Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979] 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,995 (10th Cir.
1979), to date the only antitrust contribution cases decided by federal courts of appeals, all
involved the assertion of contribution claims against unnamed, nonsettling defendants.
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